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Abstract. The strategic objectives for ﬁsheries, which are enshrined in international
conventions, are to maintain or restore stocks to produce maximum sustainable yield (MSY)
and to implement the ecosystem approach, requiring that interactions between species be
taken into account and conservation constraints be respected. While the yield and
conservation aims are, to some extent, compatible when a ﬁshery for a single species is
considered, species interactions entail that MSY for a species depends on the species with
which it interacts, and the yield and conservation objectives therefore conﬂict when an
ecosystem approach to ﬁsheries management is required. We applied a conceptual size- and
trait-based model to clarify and resolve these issues by determining the ﬁshing pattern that
maximizes the total yield of an entire ﬁsh community in terms of catch biomass or economic
rent under acceptable conservation constraints. Our results indicate that the eradication of
large, predatory ﬁsh species results in a potential maximum catch at least twice as high as if
conservation constraints are imposed. However, such a large catch could only be achieved at a
cost of forgone rent; maximum rent extracts less than half of the potential maximum catch
mass. When a conservation constraint is applied, catch can be maximized at negligible cost in
forgone rent, compared with maximizing rent. Maximization of rent is the objective that
comes closest to respecting conservation concerns.
Key words: conservation; ecosystem approach to ﬁsheries management; maximum economic yield;
maximum sustainable yield; North Sea; size spectrum model.
INTRODUCTION
The development of agriculture over 10 000 years ago
by deliberate transformation of terrestrial ecosystems
resulted in increased food production from cultivated
plants and domesticated animals, and allowed human
population growth to accelerate (Harris 1996). In
contrast, ﬁshing remains a hunter-gathering activity,
reliant on ‘‘natural’’ ecosystems despite the increasing
sophistication, power, and efﬁciency of modern capture
methods. With the exception of aquaculture, marine
ecosystems have not been deliberately transformed to
increase food production, although ﬁshing and other
human impacts have caused widespread unintended
changes. By the middle of the 20th century, ﬁshing had a
global impact on marine ecosystems (Jackson et al.
2001), and after about 1990, the global yield from
marine capture ﬁsheries leveled off and began to decline
(FAO 2014). A growing human population imposes an
increasing demand for food, and the environmental
costs of maximizing food production are obvious. Food
production and conservation objectives are not fully
compatible (Hilborn 2007), and the central task of
modern management of global ﬁsheries is to achieve the
optimal balance between conservation and production
of food and wealth. The aspiration to reconcile high
levels of food production with sustainability and
conservation is expressed by the maximum sustainable
yield (MSY) concept and the ‘‘ecosystem approach to
ﬁsheries management.’’
The MSY concept views a ﬁsh stock as a production
unit whose production should be maximized (in terms of
food or wealth) without compromising the reproductive
potential of the stock. MSY originated in realpolitik as
well as science (Mesnil 2012), and has now become the
overarching objective in ﬁsheries management in Europe
(EU Regulation 1380/2013, Article 2.2; EU 2013).
International commitments to maintain and restore ﬁsh
stocks to levels that can produce MSY were made at Rio
de Janeiro (UN 1992) and Johannesburg (UN 2002).
The latter required that MSY should be achieved by
2015. The aspiration to achieve food production and
conservation goals is laudable and timely, but the use of
a reassuring term like MSY does not of itself resolve the
potential conﬂict between food production and conser-
vation. In fact, it is evident that, in addition to this
unresolved conﬂict, MSY as applied to individual
species is not a well-deﬁned objective and provides, at
best, incomplete policy guidance for ecosystem sustain-
ability (Gaichas 2008) since the productivity of any
species depends on its interactions with predators and
prey, which are also affected by ﬁshing.
Manuscript received 24 June 2014; revised 19 September




The MSY concept is born of a tradition that considers
each ﬁsh stock in isolation. However, ﬁshing changes the
abundances of predators and prey, and thus alters the
yield of species affected by those predators and prey
(Gislason 1999). Predator–prey interactions affect not
only the maximum yield that can be taken from each
individual species, but also the total ﬁsh yield of the
system (Brander and Mohn 1991). Furthermore, when
several species are taken in mixed ﬁsheries there is a risk
that vulnerable species (those most sensitive to ﬁshing
pressure) will be exploited above the level needed to
produce MSY, as higher levels of ﬁshing are applied to
produce MSY for less vulnerable species. Some vulner-
able species will be put at risk of local or global
extinction (Dulvy et al. 2003). The single-stock approach
to ﬁsheries management is therefore unable to guide
strategic management of an ecosystem (May et al. 1979).
This realization has resulted in the adoption of the
ecosystem approach to ﬁsheries management (Reykjavik
Declaration 2001, FAO 2001), which requires that ﬁsh
production objectives are constrained by conservation
objectives and that biological and technical interactions
between species are taken into account.
If implementations of the MSY goal do not take
biological and technical interactions into account they
will be inconsistent with the ecosystem approach. In the
EU, the Marine Strategy Framework Directive recog-
nizes this shortcoming in the criteria being developed to
deﬁne Good Environmental Status (in order to fulﬁll
both MSY and conservation objectives). The scientiﬁc
report dealing with the issue (Piet et al. 2010) says that
decisions about how to resolve the interaction between
species are a political, not a scientiﬁc, matter, but the
response of the EU Commission (EU 2010) was that
‘‘Further research is needed to address the fact that [. . .]
MSY may not be achieved for all stocks simultaneously
due to possible interactions between them.’’ This need
for guidance on how to achieve an acceptable and
economically sensible balance between food production
and conservation objectives, which takes into account
the technical and biological interactions between species,
is evident (Gislason 1999, Worm et al. 2009, Voss et al.
2014) and is the subject of the present work.
At least two issues must be considered in order to
resolve the conﬂict between food production and
conservation objectives in an ecosystem context. First,
what do we mean by MSY when the interactions
between species are taken into account? For example,
the value of a catch depends on the value of the
individual species in the catch; a catch composed of
forage ﬁsh is usually less valuable than the same biomass
of ﬁsh for human consumption. The maximization of
protein yield will therefore not automatically lead to a
maximization of the wealth generated (the maximum
economic yield [MEY]; Voss et al. 2014). Second, how
can MSY be reconciled with the need to sustain the
composition, structure, and function of the ecosystems
concerned? These are clearly very difﬁcult questions that
could take a long time to work through, but the
Johannesburg Declaration requires that MSY should
be achieved by 2015.
The kinds of questions our work is intended to
address are: 1) What is MSY as applied to a ﬁsh
ecosystem with biological interactions? and, 2) What
patterns of ﬁshing will maximize either total catch or
economic rent from such an ecosystem, with and
without conservation constraints? We applied a
size- and trait-based model that was parameterized to
represent the ﬁsh and ﬁsheries component of a generic
ecosystem akin to the North Sea. Despite the model
being a crude simpliﬁcation of a complex natural
ecosystem, it does provide general guidance on how
predator–prey interactions shape the yield from the
entire ﬁsh community of interacting species. Our
exploration takes the form of scenarios where manage-
ment adjusts the ﬁshing pattern to optimize production




Size spectrum models provide a simple representation
based on the size of individuals, of the dynamics of ﬁsh
communities (Benoit and Rochet 2004, Andersen and
Beyer 2006, Hartvig et al. 2011), and how they respond
to ﬁshing (Andersen and Pedersen 2010, Houle et al.
2013). They are based on a few simple and generally
accepted assumptions, they contain a small set of
species-independent parameters, and they are computa-
tionally efﬁcient. The central process in the models is the
predation by larger individuals on smaller individuals to
fuel growth and reproduction. The models therefore
resolve food-dependent somatic growth of individuals,
which is neglected in classic food web models based on
Lotka-Volterra type of equations. Here we used the
previously published trait-based formulation of the size
spectrum model, which represents the biomass density of
individuals as a function of the size (mass) of individuals
w and the asymptotic (maximum) size that the individual
may reach W (Fig. 1A; Andersen and Pedersen 2010).
The use of a trait (here W ) as a continuous variable
avoids the need to represent individual species (Norberg
et al. 2001). The model employs size-based scaling and
life history invariants to reduce the number of param-
eters to a general set that captures a typical ﬁsh
community (Pope et al. 2006) such that the model
generates quantitative predictions that are not speciﬁc to
a particular ecosystem. To provide meaningful numbers
in the economic part of the model, we have used prices
and costs from the ﬁshery in the North Sea. Full details
of the concepts, assumptions, equations, and parameters
of the model are provided in the Appendix.
Optimal harvesting
Each asymptotic size group is ﬁshed with a trawl-like
selectivity pattern with a minimum size at 5% of the
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asymptotic size. The control variables in the model are
the ﬁshing mortalities, Fi, generated by three ﬁsheries,
each referred to by the subscript i taking values 1 to 3,
that target different ranges of asymptotic size groups: a
‘‘forage’’ ﬁshery for ﬁsh meal and oil (asymptotic mass
W , 100 g), a ‘‘pelagic’’ ﬁshery (W ranging from 100 to
5000 g), and a ﬁshery for large ‘‘demersal’’ species (W .
5000 g) (Fig. 1B). Fmean, the average of the three ﬁshing
mortalities, ranged from 0 to 5 yr1. The allocation of
effort between the three ﬁsheries for any given average
ﬁshing mortality level is adjusted to maximize the catch
in terms of protein (the total mass of ﬁsh caught, Ycatch)
or rent (the resource rent, Yrent).
Three types of community-level maximization were
performed, each for varying levels of average ﬁshing
mortality: maximizing catch, maximizing rent, and
maximizing catch while preventing the spawning stock
biomass of any species from falling below 20% of
unﬁshed spawning stock biomass (Table 1).
A simple bioeconomic model was used to calculate
resource rent. Resource rent is total revenue minus total
costs, and total costs include operational costs (fuel,
labor, ice, maintenance, administration, et cetera),
depreciation of capital (the loss of capital value during
operation) and opportunity cost of capital (the forgone
return on capital from the best alternative use, e.g., loan
repayment). Rent differs from private proﬁt because the
latter does not consider alternative use of capital as a
cost. The rent of ﬁshery i is the biomass yield of all size
groups yi(w) multiplied by a size-dependent price p(w)





Price per mass is a function of individual mass: p } wc.
The exponent was determined by ﬁtting to prices of ﬁsh
from the North Sea as c ’ 0.41 (Appendix: Fig. A1).
The cost of ﬁshing was assumed proportional to the
effort Fi with a constant of proportionality depending
on the catchability of the stock Ci ¼ aFiWbi . The
parameters a and b in the cost function were determined
by reference to an average ﬁshing pattern in the North
Sea (Fi’ 0.7 yr
1; Pope et al. 2006). Since all asymptotic
size groups are currently ﬁshed in the North Sea, we
assumed that the rents of the three ﬁshing ﬂeets were
approximately similar. This information was used to
calibrate the parameter b. Further, it was assumed that
overall the ﬁshery is only marginally proﬁtable (Statis-
tics Denmark 2012), i.e., the rent is a small fraction of
the revenue, which is used to calibrate a (Appendix: Fig.
A2). We explored other cost functions where cost
depends on abundance of the targeted stock to conﬁrm
FIG. 1. (A) Example of an un-ﬁshed community (gray line)
and the impact of ﬁshing with a pattern of ﬁshing mortality that
maximizes rent (black line). Thick lines show the size
distribution of the entire ﬁsh community and a zooplankton
resource (dashed) as a function of individual mass. Individuals
are characterized by a trait: asymptotic size. Each thin line
shows the biomass of individuals from species with a given
asymptotic size. The central process in the model is predation
by larger predators on smaller prey described by log-normal
size-selection function (gray area shown for a 10-g predator).
The rest of the model is derived from a bioenergetic budget of
energy within each individual ﬁsh and from keeping track of
mass ﬂows. (B) Fishing is described by a trawl-type size
selection where individuals are targeted by the ﬁshery when they
reach a fraction of their asymptotic size. The ﬁshing mortality
(F ) on the nine simulated species is grouped into three ﬁsheries
each targeting small (forage ﬁsh), medium (pelagic), or large
species (demersal).
TABLE 1. Speciﬁcation of objectives for community-level maximizations.
Scenario Description
1a) ‘‘Catch’’ Maximizing total catch: maxF Ycatchf g where Ycatch ¼
P
Yi is the yield measured in biomass per time from all
the three ﬁsheries, and F refers to the ﬁshing mortalities in the three ﬁsheries (i).
1b) ‘‘Zero’’ The maximal total catch with zero resource rent.
2) ‘‘Rent’’ Maximizing total resource rent: maxF Yrentf g, where Yrent ¼
P
Ri is the sum of the rent Ri from all three
ﬁsheries.
3) ‘‘Conserve’’ Maximizing catch while preventing the spawning stock biomass of any species from falling below 20% of
unﬁshed spawning stock biomass.
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that the qualitative results are not overly sensitive to the
cost function (Appendix: Fig. A3).
RESULTS
At low average ﬁshing mortality (Fmean), both total
catch (Ycatch) and rent (Yrent) were maximized by
allocating all the effort to the demersal (large ﬁsh)
ﬁshery (Fig. 2A; Appendix: Figs. A3A and A4A). As
the average ﬁshing mortality increases, ﬁsheries for
medium and small species begin. The pattern of effort
allocation between the three ﬁsheries diverges depend-
ing on whether the target is to maximize total catch or
rent, with rent maximization prioritizing higher valued
large ﬁsh over lower valued small ﬁsh. These
differences, however, only have a small impact on
total yield and rent (Fig. 2B). For an average ﬁshing
mortality, Fmean . 0.3 yr
1, total catch is maximized
when the effort is divided evenly between the three
ﬂeets.
Total catch continued to increase until an average
ﬁshing mortality was approximately equal to 5 yr1.
This suggests that even in a highly exploited marine
ecosystem such as the North Sea, where the average
ﬁshing mortality was approximately equal to 0.7 yr1
in the mid 1980s and has since declined to ;0.4 yr1,
the total catch could be increased at least by a factor
of two (Fig. 2B). Maximizing total catch requires that
all except the smallest and most productive species are
ﬁshed to extinction (Fig. 3), an ecosystem transfor-
mation that resembles agriculture, where removing
unwanted predators and competitors maximizes the
production of selected plants and herbivorous ani-
mals.
The largest species are the ﬁrst to drop below 20% of
unﬁshed biomass (Fig. 3), and thus breach the
conservation constraint. Reducing the proportion of
average ﬁshing mortality on large species could keep
them within the conservation limit; however, this
would result in increased predation pressure on
medium-sized species (asymptotic mass ’ 100 g) and
rapidly cause them to drop below the 20% limit. It is
therefore not possible to allocate a higher level of
average ﬁshing mortality between the three ﬁsheries
while keeping all species above the conservation limits
(Appendix: Fig. A4).
DISCUSSION
Comparing the catch and rent between management
objectives illustrates the trade-offs between the objec-
tives (Fig. 4): (1) Maximizing the catch has a very high
FIG. 2. Steady-state ﬁshing mortality to maximize catch
and rent. (A) Steady-state allocation of effort (mortality, Fi )
between three ﬂeets targeting small ﬁsh (forage species; thin
lines), medium (pelagic species; medium lines), or large
(demersal species; thick lines) when maximizing catch (solid)
or rent (dashed). Panel (B) shows the result of the maximization
as a function of the average ﬁshing mortality of the three ﬂeets:
ﬁshed stock biomass in the community (thin black lines) and
total catch Ycatch (thick black lines), both normalized by the
biomass in the unﬁshed community, and rent (gray lines)
normalized by maximum rent. Results are shown when either
catch Ycatch (solid lines) or rent Yrent (dashed lines) are
maximized. The lines showing the results of maximizing rent
are cut short beyond the average ﬁshing mortality, Fmean, which
maximizes rent for clarity (see Appendix: Fig. A3 for full
ﬁgure). The vertical lines are drawn at the effort where one
species drops below 20% of unexploited biomass when
maximizing catch (solid) or rent (dashed). Thus, the conserva-
tion constraint is violated on the right side of the vertical lines.
FIG. 3. Impact of optimal ﬁshing on the spawning stock
biomass (SSB) relative to the unﬁshed situation (horizontal
dashed line). SSB above (below) the black line means higher
(lower) biomass than in the un-ﬁshed situation. The gray area is
where the SSB is below 20% of the unﬁshed SSB. Results are
shown for the three ﬁshing patterns maximizing catch (black
solid line), rent (gray line), and catch while respecting the
conservation constraint that no species is allowed to go below a
biomass of 20% of the unﬁshed biomass (dotted line).
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cost; (2) the maximal catch where the rent is not negative
occurs at a high average ﬁshing mortality (Fmean ’ 1.5
yr1), and results in a catch about two-thirds of the
maximum catch; (3) maximizing rent (at average ﬁshing
mortality ’ 0.5 yr1) yields about half the maximum
catch; and (4) respecting the conservation constraint
(average ﬁshing mortality ’ 0.3 yr1) gives about one-
fourth of the unconstrained maximum catch, but only a
small reduction of rent compared to maximum rent.
This supports the idea of a ‘‘pretty good yield’’ (Hilborn
2010), where forgoing a small proportion of the
maximum yield, in this case in terms of rent, not
biomass, results in a signiﬁcant gain in resilience or
conservation. The apparent compatibility of rent max-
imization with conservation makes it tempting to
conclude that if ﬁsheries management were left to
unsubsidized market forces the conservation constraint
would be self-generated. However, this conclusion
ignores two crucial issues: Firstly, individual ﬁshers will
maximize their own rent, not the average rent of the
entire ecosystem, and thereby ﬁsh in combination so all
rent is dissipated (Gordon 1954). Secondly, vulnerable
species may be more vulnerable to ﬁshing than the
‘‘average’’ species represented in our model, and may
require special protective measures (Burgess et al. 2013).
Nevertheless, the simulations indicate that rent maximi-
zation is more compatible with conservation than is
yield maximization. It would be worthwhile investigat-
ing whether special measures (selective gear that releases
large species, protected areas, spatial planning) can be
used to conserve the most sensitive species, since this
may allow higher yields from the remaining species.
Conservation efforts on land employ a mix of protected
areas, spatial planning, and special conservation mea-
sures to protect vulnerable species and habitats while
maximizing agricultural production (Brussaard et al.
2010).
Other size-based ecosystem models have found that
the entire ecosystem collapses at levels of exploitation
corresponding to an average mortality of ;1.2 yr1
(Worm et al. 2009) (collapse at a harvest rate u ’ 0.7,
which corresponds to a ﬁshing mortality ofln(1 u) ’
1.2 yr1), whereas our results indicate that the system
can be exploited much harder, albeit with a loss of large
species. Why do two seemingly similar models give such
qualitatively different results? We believe the difference
stems from differences in the strength of coupling
between the different species in the models through
predation mortality. Both models enforce a balance
between growth and inﬂicted predation mortality: For
an individual to achieve a certain growth, a correspond-
ing number of prey have to be eaten. In the Hall et al.
(2006) model, the level of predation mortality is
furthermore reduced by the introduction of ‘‘other
food,’’ which is used as a tuning parameter. The applied
tuning results in predation mortalities that are much
lower than independently estimated predation mortali-
ties (Fig. 3d in Rochet et al. 2011). The parameterization
of the model applied in Worm et al. (2009) is therefore
representing the ecosystem as a set of weakly coupled
single-species models. The low predation mortalities in
the Hall et al. model mean that smaller species beneﬁt
little from release of predation when the larger species
are ﬁshed out of the system and thus collapse at a low
ﬁshing mortality. When larger species are ﬁshed out in
our model, the small species are released from predation
mortality and can therefore tolerate higher ﬁshing
mortality before collapsing.
The results should be interpreted in the light of the
limitations of the trait-based model. As with most food
web models, we represent the mass ﬂow between
different parts of the ecosystems, while ignoring many
other effects. We assume that ﬁsh species are character-
ized by just one trait (asymptotic size) and that all
individuals are equally desirable targets for ﬁshing.
Variability between naturally occurring species with the
same asymptotic size means that they have differing
sensitivities to ﬁshing (beyond that captured by size) and
variability of prices between different species, despite
same size, means that they will be targeted with variable
intensity. In practice, the targeting of desirable species
could lead to the system being taken over by non-
desirable species. The model is also unable to resolve
how ﬁshed species may have increased sensitivities to
environmental ﬂuctuations (Anderson et al. 2008). The
model predicts that removing large predators can
signiﬁcantly increase biomass production, but in the
real world there must be concern that such an
impoverished system is liable to switch from a (forage)
ﬁsh-dominated state to a jelly-dominated state
(Richardson et al. 2009), such as was seen in the Black
Sea (Daskalov et al. 2007). Other simpliﬁcations are the
crude representation of ﬁsheries selectivity and the
assumption of omnipotent managers in the maximiza-
tion. Taken together, these caveats mean that the results
FIG. 4. Total catch (black) and rent (gray) for four possible
objectives: maximizing catch (Catch), maximizing catch at zero
rent (Zero), maximizing rent (Rent), or maximizing catch
keeping SSB about 20% of unﬁshed levels (Conserve; see Table
1 for further clariﬁcation of scenarios). Yield is shown relative
to the standing stock, measured in biomass or price at zero
ﬁshing mortality.
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should be considered as elaborate Gendankenexperi-
mente (‘‘thought experiments’’) to explore the dynamics
of ﬁsh production at a strategic and conceptual level
rather than as immediate operational management
input.
When the costs and economics of ﬁsheries are
included, the conﬂicts between yield and conservation
objectives almost disappear; conservation of large ﬁsh
species can be achieved without foregoing a signiﬁcant
proﬁt. This apparent compatibility between conserva-
tion and economic maximization arises because we have
assigned higher value to larger individuals than to
smaller individuals, as observed in the North Sea. This
is, of course, subject to local effects, e.g., highly valued
small species like shrimps or anchovies, and to the future
price development of ﬁshmeal. While the higher value of
large individuals may well be representative of industri-
ally exploited ecosystems in the northern hemisphere
such as the North Sea, it is not generally valid (Sethi et
al. 2010). In systems where price per mass is independent
of body size the economic and conservation objectives
are unlikely to be compatible and the result of economic
maximization would be more similar to catch maximi-
zation.
A maximization of total ﬁsh production from the sea
entails a transformation of the marine ecosystem to one
dominated by small, fast-growing species feeding low
down the food chain. This would require continuing
costly ﬁsheries to remove predators and would be both
uneconomic and unacceptable on conservation grounds
and incompatible with exploiting individual populations
at or below MSY. With a human population exceeding
seven billion and still growing, the forgone protein
production that conservation entails is a pressing issue:
You cannot have your ﬁsh and eat it too. However, the
consequences of marine conservation do not stop at the
shoreline; demand for marine protein that is not met,
because of forgone marine production, is likely to affect
terrestrial production systems that face similar conser-
vation concerns (Hall et al. 2013).
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